Reading done on February 25 2018

"The Strategic Logic of Islamic State Information Operations"

  • by Haroro J. Ingram
  • Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 6, 729-752 - 2015
  • DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2015.1059799

This article argues that "the overarching purpose of IS’s IO campaign is to shape the perceptions and polarise the support of audiences via messages that interweave appeals to pragmatic and perceptual factors. Pragmatic factors—such as security, stability and livelihood—are leveraged in IS messaging by promoting the efficacy of its politico-military campaign and denigrating its enemies’ efforts via rational-choice (logic of consequence) appeals. Perceptual factors—which are tied to the interplay of in-group, Other, crisis and solution constructs—are leveraged via identity-choice (logic of appropriateness) appeals that frame IS as the champion of Sunni Muslims (the in-group identity), its enemies as Others complicit in Sunni perceptions of crisis, and IS as the only hope for solving this malaise" (Ingram 2015, 729).

", IS pro- duces narratives that frame itself as the champion of Sunni Muslims (the in-group identity) and its enemies as malignant Others (out-group identities) responsible for Sunni perceptions of crisis, and thus presents IS as the sole bearer of the solution to the lethal malaise facing Sunnis" (Ingram 2015, 730).

"[R]adical insurgent groups, such as IS, tend to disseminate messages that are designed to build an affinity between the group and potential supporters via appeals to a shared identity (i.e. an in-group identity), of which the group constructs itself as the champion and protector, while framing its enemies as evil Others (i.e. out- group identities) that are responsible for crises" (Ingram 2015, 733).

"There are three levels to IS’s media architecture: central media units, provincial information offices and its broader membership/supporter base. IS’s central al Hayat, al-Furqan, al-Itisam and Ajnad media centres tend to produce IO that are disseminated online and designed for transnational audiences.4 Messages from its central media units focus predominantly on major announcements from IS’s central command, raising the profile of key events and issues or, in the case of Ajnad, producing audio nasheeds (‘hymns’) and sura recitations. Tar- geting predominantly regional and local audiences, IS’s wilayat information offices produce communiqués that focus on more localised issues and events, using mainly local platforms such as billboards, radio, posters and public events to disseminate its messages" (Ingram 2015, 734).

What is the purpose of IS messaging?

Shaping perceptions, polarising:
"IS communiqués are designed to influence how its audiences" (Ingram 2015, 735).
- reinforced by emotive imagery and powerful symbolism (Ingram 2015, 736)

"IS communiqués are designed to align rational- and identity-choice decision-making in its audiences. The more rational-choice decisions are processed from the perspective of IS’s system of meaning, the greater the potential for its messages to resonate, influence and act as a driver of mobilisation" (Ingram 2015, 736).

Promoting and synchronising, denigrating and rupturing
"Two factors fundamentally shaped the characteristics of IS’s IO efforts in support of its politico-military campaign" (Ingram 2015, 737).

"IS now devotes a significant portion of its IO activities to portraying its governance apparatus as multidimensional, sophisticated, bureaucratised and well resourced" (Ingram 2015, 737).

Political/governance initiatives
"By promoting a diverse array of political and governance initiatives, IS is attempting to appeal to the broadest potential supporter base. This is especially important in its appeals to local popu- lations that may be directly affected by its system of control. From the estab- ’صور من المعهد الشرعي في ولاية كركوك‘( lishment of a forensics team in Kirkuk [‘Photo Report of Forensic Office in Kirkuk’] 2015) to a bustling fish market in Mosul (‘صور من سوق السمك في مدينة الموصل’ [‘Photo Report of Fish Market in Mosul’] 2015), the distribution of charity to the poor in Aleppo (‘توزيع أموال الزكاة على الفقراء والمحتاجين في أخترين وماحولها’ [‘Photo Report Giving Charity to the Poor’] 2015) and infrastructure repairs in Fallujah (‘مركز الخدمات 2 إعادة النور إلى أسواق و شوارع الولاية’ [‘Repairing the Street Lights’] 2015), IS is actively portraying itself as the only viable source of security, stability and livelihood for local contested populations. However, these messaging trends are also mirrored in the communiqués disseminated by IS’s central media units for transnational consumption" (Ingram 2015, 739).

The military
- "A crucial means by which IS IO leverage pragmatic factors is by presenting IS as a highly capable, adaptable and ruthless military force" (Ingram 2015, 739).
- "IO is used to support IS’s military campaign both tactically—as a ‘force-multiplying’ psychological operations tool to coerce its opponents (on display in its capture of Mosul)—and as a means not only to paint the strategic and historical context for its operations, but also to weave these narratives into a cosmic struggle between good and evil (Clanging of Swords 2014; Flames of War 2014). In order to secure the support of and mobilise loyalists, coerce the acquiescence of undecided locals and terrorise its enemies into retreat, IS addresses friends and foes with the same message: ‘We are an unstoppable military force’" (Ingram 2015, 740).

Counternarratives
"Finally, portraying the efficacy and diversity of IS’s politico-military campaign has featured prominently in IS counternarrative efforts. This strategy has been central to IS videos featuring the captured British journalist John Cantlie, who, presumably under significant duress, has delivered IS counter-narratives in a style that is meant to be personalised and journalistic" (Ingram 2015, 740).

Divine duty and cosmic war
"IS leverages perceptual drivers in its IO campaign by producing narratives that link IS to the in-group identity (i.e. Sunni Muslims) and solutions (i.e. IS’s politico-military agenda) whilst framing its enemies (i.e. anyone who is not Sunni and IS-aligned) as malevolent out-group identities (Others) responsible for Sunni perceptions of crisis. These dichotomised in- and out-group identities thus act as ‘cognitive prisms’ through which the perceptions of its audiences are shaped. As al-Baghdadi declared:
the world today has been divided into two camps and two trenches, with no third camp present: The camp of Islam and faith, and the camp of kufr (dis- belief) and hypocrisy—the camp of the Muslims and the mujahidin every- where, and the camp of the jews, the crusaders, their allies, and with them the rest of the nations and religions of kufr, all being led by America and Russia, and being mobilized by the jews (Al-Baghdadi 2014, 3)"(Ingram 2015, 741).

"IS exacerbates this sense of crisis by plunging its audience into not just a deeply historical war, but also a divine one:
Muslim blood that was shed under the hands of your religion is not cheap. In fact, their blood is the purest blood because there is a nation behind them [that] inherits revenge ... Our battle is a battle between faith and blasphemy, between truth and falsehood, until there is no more polytheism and obedience becomes Allah’s on its entirety (Until There Came to Them Clear Evidence 2015)" (Ingram 2015, 741).

"This dense pall of crisis is designed to magnify the appeal of the in-group collec- tive as a physical and psychological sanctuary from these crises, and in-group narratives (for example, the ideology attached to this identity) as an existential and socio-political blueprint for the solution" (Ingram 2015, 741).

IS’s system of meaning
"From IS’s perspective, the world’s inherent bipolarity is absolute, lethally uncompromising and perpetual. Naturally, IS portrays itself as the epitome of the in-group, its champion and protector" (Ingram 2015, 742).

"IS messages present politico-military actions, whether its own or those of its enemies, as manifestations of a divine war" (Ingram 2015, 742).

"While IS seems to emphasise appeals to pragmatic factors in its messages to local populations that are disseminated by its wilayat information offices, per- ceptual factors are decidedly prominent in its appeals to transnational constitu- encies. IS’s central media units bombard its transnational audiences with messages that fuse narrative, imagery and symbolism to emphasise the primacy of one’s Muslim identity over all others" (Ingram 2015, 742).

Baiting: a signature strategy of IS IO
"IS often engages in military operations that are designed to provoke misguided or disproportionate responses from its enemies in order to ferment perceptions of crisis in its communities of potential support. IS then leverages these increased perceptions of crisis to present itself as the only viable source of protection and stability for its constituencies. This strategy broadly reflects Guevara’s (2007) ‘foco’ strategy—i.e. the idea that a small band of guerrillas can fuel and spread the conditions for revolution via targeted politico-military efforts" (Ingram 2015, 744).

Implications for counternarrative development

"Firstly, more needs to be done to target IS’s wilayat-based information offices" (Ingram 2015, 746).

"Secondly, government counternarrative strategies must avoid confronting IS ideologically. A major implication of this study is that the potency of Islamist ideology is unleashed when suras and Hadiths are presented as mechanisms to understand broader contextual issues related to identity, crisis and solution con- structs. Even the most jurisprudentially sound counter-IS case reinforces IS’s central narrative if it is delivered or expedited by non-Muslim actors (i.e. the Other). Islamic proselytising by non-Muslims not only commands zero credi- bility, especially amongst those most susceptible to radicalisation, but also inad- vertently undermines the ‘moderate’ ideologues and community leaders who are so crucial in fighting extremism. Moreover, IS’s ongoing IO civil war is far more damaging than any ideological case any non-Muslim actor could produce. Government resources would be better used in developing counternarrative strategies based on ‘reverse-engineering’ the core principles underpinning the strategic logic of IS’s IO campaign. Messages that pertinently attach IS to perceptions of crisis, denigrate its system of control, and expose ruptures between its narrative and action will be more effective than counter-proselytising efforts" (Ingram 2015, 747).